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Introduction 
Meeting competition occurs when an undertaking lowers its prices in response to the 
entry of a competitor. Despite accepting that meeting competition can be compatible 
with Article 82, the Commission
2 a nd the Court of justice
3 have repeatedly 
condemned the practice due to the m odalities of implementation or “particular 
circumstances”.
4 However, existing precedent on the subject remains obscurely 
reasoned and contradictory, such that it is at the present time impossible to give clear 
advice to undertakings on the circumstances in which meeting competition is 
compatible with Article 82. 
Not only is such legal uncertainty in itself damaging but, in so far as it discourages 
meeting competition, it appears to us to be harmful to competition. As concerns the 
latter point, it will be seen that some of the most powerful arguments against 
prohibiting meeting competition are based on the counterproductive nature of the 
remedies. 
The present article does not, however, aim to propose a simple solution to distinguish 
abusive and non-abusive meeting competition.
5 Nor does the article aim to give a 
                                                 
1   Ashurst Brussels. 
2  Decision of the Commission of 22 December 1987 in  Hilti, O.J. (1988) L 65/19; Decision of the 
Commission of 14 December 1985 in AKZO, O.J. (1985) L 374/1; Decision of the Commission of 18 July 1988 in 
Napier Brown, O.J. (1988) 284/41; Decision of the Commission of 5 December 1988 in BPB, O.J. (1989) L 10/50; 
Decision of the Commission of 23 December 1993 in Compagnie Maritime Belge, O.J. (1993) L 34/20; Decision of 
the Commission of 14 May 1997 in Irish Sugar, O.J. (1997) L 258/1; Commission press release IP/97/868 of 10 
October 1997 on Digital Undertakings. 
3  Case T-30/89, Hilti, 1991, ECR p.II-1439; Case C-62/86, AKZO, 1991, ECR p.I-3359; Case T-65/89, 
BPB, 1993, ECR p.II-389; Case T-83/91, Tetra Pak II, 1994, ECR p.II-755; Cases T-24, 25, 26 28/93, Compagnie 
Maritime Belge, 1996, ECR p.II-1211; Case T-228/97, Irish Sugar, 1999, ECR p.II-2969; Case C-395/96 P, 
Compagnie Maritime Belge, 2000, ECR p.I-1365. 
4  See e.g. Irish Sugar, supra footnote 1, p.184. 
5  See BAUMOL, W., “Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for the Prevention of Predatory 
Pricing”, Yale Law Journal, 1979, Volume 89, No. 1; EDLIN, A., “Stopping above Cost Predatory Pricing”, Yale Law 
Journal, 2002, Volume 111, No. 941.  
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comprehensive overview of the existing case law in this area.
6 Instead, it takes a 
more economic approach and aims to lay out in a (brief but) systematic fashion the 
competitive concerns that might potentially be raised by the practice of meeting 
competition and in doing so to try to identify the main flaws in the Court and 
Commission’s approach. 
 
I  A Practical Example 
Let us begin with a practical example: 
Domco has 90% of the UK widget market and charges a flat rate of 10 GBP per 
widget. Newco has begun producing and selling widgets in Scotland and selling them 
for 7 GBP. Domco, whose average total cost for producing widgets is 5 GBP, 
essentially has two ways in which to react to his new competitor. He can (a) cut his 
prices across the whole of the UK (across the board price cuts) or (b) cut his prices in 
Scotland (selective or targeted price cuts). We will assume here that in both situations 
Domco keeps his prices above average total cost and therefore cannot be accused of 
predatory pricing in the traditional AKZO
7 sense of the term. 
The above set of facts will serve as a simple basis to look at the competitive concerns 
associated with non-discriminatory reactive price cuts (section II) and targeted 
reactive price cuts (section III). 
 
II  Across the Board Price Cuts to Meet Competition 
With the possible exception of Compagnie Maritime Belge,
8 which puts a question 
mark over this point, above cost, across the board price cuts appear not to be 
contrary to Article 82 in the eyes of the Commission and the Court.
9 We will 
nevertheless begin by looking at across the board price cuts, not only because the 
Compagnie Maritime Belge case appears to fall within this category, but also because 
the arguments are simpler than those in selective meeting competition. 
                                                 
6  For such an overview see, for example, WAELBROECK, M., “Meeting Competition: Is this a Valid Defence 
for a Firm in a Dominant Position?” in Studi in honore di Francesco Capotorti, Giuffre, 1999, p.489. 
7  Supra footnote 1. 
8  Supra footnote 1. The Commission alleged discriminatory pricing in its decision (at p.83) but this was not 
reiterated in the operative part of the decision. The Court took this to mean that discrimination was not part of the 
abuse (see judgment of CFI at p.150). 
9  It will be recalled that in Compagnie Maritime Belge, it was explicitly stated that price cuts were non-
discriminatory.  
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In broad terms there are two potential competitive concerns with across the board 
price cuts. Firstly, such price cuts may be thought exclusionary since, if Newco is 
unable to effectively compete on price, it may be forced to leave the market. This was 
a key concern expressed by the Court in Compagnie Maritime Belge.
10 Secondly, it 
may be thought that Domco’s pricing policy before Newco’s entry was exploitative as 
Domco was able to make deep price cuts in response to Newco’s entry and yet still 
sell above cost. These two concerns are also connected to an extent as, for example, 
it may be that once Newco has been successfully excluded, Domco will be able to 
raise its prices again to “exploitative” levels. 
As these claims are looked at in more detail, however, it becomes increasingly 
evident that there exist serious arguments against considering either of these as 
creating problems under Article 82. 
Firstly, accepting that across the board price cuts are exclusionary and therefore 
abusive essentially equates to introducing a radical new theory of above cost 
predatory pricing, of doubtful economic validity. Meeting competition is simply 
competition on the merits and market exit caused by such legitimate competition 
should not be condemned. Moreover, even if one were to accept that competition law 
should be concerned by this particular type of price competition, it appears difficult to 
create appropriate remedies. Secondly, as regards exploitation, given the difficulty of 
calculating what constitutes an excessive price, one may wonder whether it should be 
the role of general antitrust enforcers to regulate prices in this way. We will return to 
the question of exploitation later, but first we will consider in more detail the claim that 
above cost price cuts can be exclusionary. 
 
A.  Exclusion 
1.  The Concern 
The concern of allowing across the board price cuts to meet competition is as follows: 
Domco - benefiting from significant economics of scale due to its size - will drop its 
price to some level above costs but at the same level or below the price asked for by 
Newco. Newco will fail to win any market share and at a certain point will give up 
leaving Domco to increase its prices again to supracompetitive levels. 
                                                 
10  See the CFI’s judgment in Compagnie Maritime Belge, supra footnote 1, p.147-148.  
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2.  Pure Price Competition and Anti-Competitive Exclusion 
As a preliminary point, it cannot be emphasised enough that the whole point of 
competition is winning the game/winning market share. Thus, in our scenario Domco 
at least wants to hold onto the market share it has (excluding Newco from winning 
Domco’s existing customers) and if possible to conquer the remaining 10% of the 
market. Companies should not be prohibited from competing, and an intent to 
compete - i.e. win market shares from a competitor and even possibly exclude it from 
the market - therefore should not be viewed as an abuse. This is nonetheless exactly 
what the Court a ppears to do in Compagnie Maritime Belge, deducing an 
exclusionary intent from the use of certain vocabulary (a note stated that Compagnie 
Maritime Belge wanted to “get rid” of a competitor).
11 The question, however, should 
be how to separate exclusion that results from anti-competitive conduct from 
exclusion that results from the normal process of competition and such a distinction is 
incapable of being made on the basis of intent alone. 
We are here less concerned with cases where a dominant firm’s meeting competition 
may have been condemned because the practice was coupled with other forms of 
conduct such as sales below cost
12 or fidelity type rebates
13 but rather by “pure” 
cases of meeting competition. As will be seen, in such cases it is not at all evident 
that the practice ought to be prohibited. 
Going back to our example, let us now assume that Domco is more efficient than 
Newco and has lower production costs. In such a scenario, Newco may very well exit 
the market if Domco lowers its prices. Moreover, Domco quite possibly intends to “get 
rid” of Newco in this way. However, all this amounts to its exclusion that results from 
the normal process of competition. Contrary to what the CFI indicates in Compagnie 
Maritime Belge,
14 just by spicing up the language and stating Domco’s intention does 
not transform the latter’s behaviour into illegal, anti-competitive exclusion. If a less 
efficient firm is unable to charge competitive prices, competition authorities ought not 
to intervene to protect it. 
                                                 
11  See the CFI’s judgment at p.147-148. This is particularly worrying as it means that, while actual effects 
on the market are irrelevant, ones choice of vocabulary and register can have a profound impact on competitive 
analysis. Advice to clients on the question of meeting competition should not be limited to pure semantics and 
tone. 
12  As was the case for example in Tetra Pak II, see supra footnote 1. 
13  As was the case for example in Hilti, see supra footnote 1.  
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Now, it may be that there is an endless supply of Newcos who can slip in and out of 
the widget market, forcing Domco either to repeatedly lower its prices to meet the 
competition or change its tactics (in which case there is clearly not much room for 
supra-competitive pricing). Alternatively, the market structure may be different. 
Barriers to entry may be very high and Newcos may be few and far between. Such a 
situation may theoretically permit Domco to raise prices in between forays by 
inefficient and therefore unsuccessful Newcos.
15 
However, the fact remains that, regardless of the market structure, Newco’s exclusion 
still results from the normal process of competition.
16 Domco is simply more efficient 
than its rivals. The Commission and Court should not prohibit this type of legitimate 
competition on the merits. Such a prohibition would not only undermine the very logic 
of the competition law system but would also involve colossal practical problems of 
implementation. 
If on the other hand, Newco is actually just as efficient as Domco or indeed more 
efficient,
17 it is hard to see how Newco could be excluded from the market on price 
competition alone (assuming that Domco does not price below cost).
18 
Notwithstanding all the above, let us assume that across the board price cuts made to 
meet competition are considered contrary to competition law. This means that 
competition law is imposing a price freeze or at least a price floor on Domco.
19 
                                                                                                                                                    
14  See supra footnote 1, p.147-148. 
15  This is the type of problem alleged by the Department of Justice in the American Airlines case currently 
on appeal before the US Supreme Court (United States v. AMR Corp 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141). 
16  These types of structural factors may influence the court’s thinking (see, for example, the Advocate 
General’s remark that the price cuts operated by  Compagnie Maritime Belge to meet competition were 
problematic partly because of the ability of Compagnie Maritime Belge quickly to expand capacity  - see in 
particular p.132-133 of the Advocate General’s opinion). It is our view that differences in market structure such as 
higher barriers to entry or ability to expand capacity quickly should not influence the categorisation of Domco’s 
behaviour as abusive or not abusive. However, if these factors do influence the Court’s thinking then the Court 
must state that this is the case, otherwise it becomes impossible for dominant firms to predict with any degree of 
certainty when meeting competition is acceptable and when it is not. In any event, it is difficult to follow the 
remarks of the Advocate General in Compagnie Maritime Belge as the maritime sector contrary e.g. to the airline 
sector is characterised by the lack of barriers to entry so that Compagnie Maritime Belge’s practice could never 
have led to the exclusion of competition. 
17  In Compagnie Maritime Belge, the new entrant accepted that it was making profit at the level of prices 
practised by the Cewal conference s and indeed it managed to increase in market shares during the period 
investigated by the Commission. 
18  Given limits of space, we will not address the thorny question of how to allocate costs here. This question 
is nonetheless highly relevant for the meeting competition debate - especially as regards common costs in cases 
of targeted meeting competition. 
19  Alternative solutions not involving price restrictions in the strict sense do exist. Notably, WILLIAMSON 
suggests restrictions on the dominant firm raising its output for a period after entry (see  WILLIAMSON, O., 
“Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis”, Yale Law Journal, 1977, Volume 87, No. 284). However, 
this approach runs into problems similar to those for price floors as outlined at points II.A.3 and II.A.4 infra. Thus,  
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Beyond the practical difficulties it involves, introducing such price restrictions is likely 
to do more harm than good. 
3.  Practical Difficulties of Price Floors 
As regards practical difficulties of this type of restriction, a large number of questions 
arise: must Domco freeze its prices or can it reduce them to some extent? In the 
latter event, by how much can Domco reduce its prices? From what point in time do 
the price restraints apply  - when Newco sells its first product, when it starts 
advertising, when it starts building its factory or perhaps when it intimates that it might 
enter the market at all? The earlier the price restraints on Domco start to operate, the 
more these restraints look like all out price regulation (to keep Domco’s prices high - 
not a particularly consumer friendly solution), the later they operate the greater the 
likelihood that Domco can circumvent the restrictions by lowering its prices pre-
emptively. Moreover, how long should the price restraints apply? Six months, a year, 
until Domco loses its dominance? 
a.  Tolerated Level of Price Cuts 
As regards the level of discounts, a preliminary remark that should be made is that 
the existing case law is confusing.
20 In some cases the Court has accepted not only 
that a dominant firm lowers its prices to the same level as the new entrant (meeting 
competition) but that the dominant firm may u ndercut its new rival (beating 
competition).
21 However, in yet other cases, dominant firms have been condemned 
for cutting prices to the same level or even above those of the new entrant.
22 
However, even if we were to settle on relevant benchmarks such as Newco’s price 
level or Domco’s existing price and were to settle on acceptable and unacceptable 
deviations from these benchmarks, problems still remain. For example, what happens 
if Domco lowers its prices before Newco fixes its own? Do the benchmarks change? 
This ties in with the next point on timing. 
                                                                                                                                                    
for example, it is unclear when the output restrictions should apply and more importantly whether such restrictions 
are helpful at all from a competition point of view. 
20  It should be underlined that the case law mentioned here relates to selective discounts as no case law 
exists specifically on the potentially abusive nature of across the board price cuts above cost. 
21  See BPB, supra footnote 1. 
22  See Compagnie Maritime Belge, supra footnote 2.  
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b.  Timing and Duration of Price Restraints 
Probably the greatest problem here is judging how long price restrictions should apply 
before and after entry (in the sense of a first sale) by Newco. 
Imposing price restrictions at any time before entry would be questionable given that 
this could effectively wipe out any downward pressure exerted on Domco’s price by 
potential competition. However, if Domco can cut its prices shortly before Newco’s 
entry, then the effectiveness of the price r estrictions from the point of  view of 
preventing exclusion is brought into question. Any answer to this based, for example, 
on the possibility of Newco to secure contracts before entering the market simply 
pushes the problem back in time but does not resolve it.
23 
Imposing price restrictions after entry is equally problematic. If the idea behind price 
floors is to prevent exclusion then logically these restrictions should only be lifted 
when the danger of exclusion is gone. However, if the danger of exclusion is gone, 
then it means that Newco is able to compete effectively with Domco even if the latter 
does cut its prices. Prohibiting meeting competition in effect becomes a prohibition of 
dominance as such, in contradiction with the very wording of Article 82 EC and the 
principle that “the fact that an undertaking in a dominant position cannot disentitle it 
from protecting its own commercial interests if they are attacked, and that such an 
undertaking must be conceded the right to take such reasonable step as it seems 
appropriate to protect its said interests.”
24 
A last point should be made here about price ceilings. As noted already, meeting 
competition could be seen as problematic as the fact that Domco can cut its prices 
and remain profitable could indicate that its prices pre-Newco entry were excessive. 
One must wonder how this problem can be answered by creating price floors but also 
when these price floors disappear whether there is call for introducing price ceilings to 
curb excessive prices in the future. These questions will be looked at in further detail 
in the context of our discussion on excessive pricing, however, the point is made 
briefly here to underline the contradictions that can easily arise in these situations. 
                                                 
23  An interesting example of a meeting competition pre-entry price war can be found in the US supreme 
court’s ruling in Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco  509 US 209 (1993). As was noted in that 
judgment, the “rebate war occurred before Brown & Williamson had sold a single black and white cigarette”. 
24  Case 22/76, United Brands, 1978, ECR p.207 at p.189.  
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4.  Why Price Floors Don’t Combat Exclusion 
Even if some way were found to overcome the multitude of practical difficulties 
involved in introducing price floors, one must question whether such restrictions 
actually do any good. The question of whether such restrictions respond to concerns 
of abusive exploitation are dealt with below at point II.B. As regards exclusion, it will 
be seen that, in the vast majority of cases, Newco will not be kept in the market just 
by imposing a price floor on Domco. 
If Newco is just as efficient or indeed more efficient than Domco, then it would have 
entered the market even in the absence of price restrictions on Domco and more 
importantly would have been able to compete and stay in the market. The only thing 
that price restrictions achieve in such a situation is to deny the benefit of any price 
reductions that Domco might have made in response to Newco’s entry. Worse still, 
depending on the form the price restrictions take,
25 Newco could potentially use 
Domco’s regulated price as an umbrella and price below Domco - to be sure to win 
market  share  - but above the price it may have entered at absent the price 
restrictions.
26 Domco’s administratively imposed price floor could even serve as some 
form of starting reference point for a long and fruitful tacit coordination of the two 
firms’ prices. 
Alternatively, if Newco is not as efficient as Domco then it may stay in the market for 
the duration of the price restrictions imposed on Domco but the moment the 
restrictions are lifted, Domco will be free to price Newco out of the market. True, 
customers of Newco have been given the transitory benefits of lower prices but in the 
mean time have been denied the benefit of any price cuts Domco might have made 
even in Newco’s absence. It is simply not the place of antitrust law to sponsor the 
forays of inefficient rivals into the market place. As Avocate General Fennelly noted in 
Compagnie Maritime Belge 
“[E]ven if they are only short lived, [across the board price cuts] benefit consumers 
and, secondly, if the dominant undertaking’s competitors are equally or more efficient, 
                                                 
25  This is less likely to happen in some models such as that proposed by EDLIN where price floors only 
come into play where the Newco enters the market with prices 20% or more below Domco. Nonetheless, one 
could still argue that absent such restrictions Newco would have priced at even more than 20% below Domco. 
26  ELHAUGE considers that in some cases a dominant firm may even raise prices during the period that 
restrictions are imposed in order to speed the day that the latter are lifted. See ELHAUGE, E., “Why above Cost 
Price Cuts to Drive out Entrants Are not Predatory - and the Implications for Defining Costs and Market Power”, 
Yale Law Journal, 2003, Volume 112, No. 681.  
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they should be able to compete on the same terms. Community competition law 
should thus not offer less efficient undertakings a safe haven against vigorous 
competition even from dominant undertakings.
27 
The only scenario in which the introduction of price floors might benefit Newco in the 
long run (i.e. prevent its exclusion) is if an inefficient Newco were able, during the 
period in which price restrictions on Domco were in place, to increase its efficiency so 
as to be able to compete with Domco after those restrictions were removed. It is 
advanced here that it is practically impossible to separate on the one hand situations 
of meeting competition involving such borderline efficient Newcos which may benefit 
from the existence of price floors and on the other hand situations not involving such 
Newcos where the effects of price floors are wholly negative. 
This point is neatly put by the US Supreme Court in Brooke Group, a case concerning 
alleged above cost predatory pricing, where it was stated that “the exclusionary effect 
of prices above a relevant measure of cost either reflects the lower cost structure of 
the alleged predator, and so represents competition on the merits, or is beyond the 
practical ability of a judicial tribunal to control without courting intolerable risks of 
chilling legitimate price competition”.
28 
Unfortunately, this is another area where the Court and Commission are silent as to 
what approach dominant firms should take. In the decision and judgment in 
Compagnie Maritime Belge the price cuts made - as recognised by the Courts is non-
discriminatory manner and above cost - by Compagnie Maritime Belge were objected 
to. However, how Compagnie Maritime Belge was to react to this was not made clear 
and certainly none of the numerous questions listed above on existence or level of 
price floors or timing of application were answered in the case. 
B.  Excessive Pricing 
As noted above, the fact that Domco is able to (substantially) lower its prices to meet 
competition could be taken as an  indication that prices pre-Newco entry were 
excessive. As a preliminary point, it should be noted that what is being objected to 
here is therefore not the act of lowering prices to meet competition but the level of 
Domco’s prices at other times. 
                                                 
27  Supra footnote 2, p.132 of the Advocate General’s opinion. A more developed analysis of the efficiency 
effects of price floors is carried out by ELHAUGE, supra footnote 25. 
28  Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 US 209 (1993).  
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This point will be returned to in the context of selective price cuts to meet competition. 
However, a brief word should be said regarding the remedies that could be used to 
combat such excessive pricing. 
Price floors don’t seem much use as they simply exacerbate the situation by forcing 
Domco to keep its prices high.
29 In response to this, it could be argued that the 
concern in the longer term is that by eliminating a competitor through price cuts 
Domco will be able to maintain excessive pricing longer than it might have if Newco 
had been given the chance to get established. However, these arguments in effect 
return us to the exclusionary effects of across the board price cuts to meet 
competition to which the objections are outlined above.
30 
The alternative would be to introduce price ceilings. Note first of all that, by shifting 
the focus of the objections to meeting competition from exclusion to exploitation, we 
arrive at remedies that are diametrically opposed (price floors as against price 
ceilings). This is worrying given that the Court and Commission are frequently unclear 
as to whether the problem is in fact exclusion or exploitation.
31 Otherwise, it should be 
emphasised that although there is some precedent of Article 82 being used to curb 
excessive prices, the case law in this area is rare and rightly so in our view, given the 
nebulous concept of “excessive” prices. 
 
III  Selective Price Cuts to Meet Competition 
Instead of across the board price cuts, Domco might react to Newco’s entry by 
lowering its prices selectively, for instance in a geographically limited areas as 
occurred, for example, in Irish Sugar.
32 
The potential objections to such behaviour are again that they could result in 
exclusion or constitute evidence of exploitation. Due to the extra differential pricing 
element that exists in cases of selective meeting competition, the analysis of the 
                                                 
29  “It would be ironic indeed if the standards for predatory pricing liability were so low that antitrust suits 
themselves became a tool for keeping prices high.” Brooke Group. 
30  In this context the comment by the US supreme court in Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco is 
particularly relevant here “Even if the ultimate effect of the cut is to induce or reestablish supracompetitive pricing, 
discouraging a price cut and forcing firms to maintain supracompetitive prices, thus depriving consumers of the 
benefits of lower prices in the interim, does not constitute sound antitrust policy”. 
31  This comment mainly applies to cases of selective price cuts where some customers are paying low 
prices and are allegedly in danger of being excluded and other are paying high prices and are therefore 
exploitative. For example, in the case of Hilti, the Commission states that Hilti’s price cuts exclude its competitors 
(because they are too low) and are also exploitative (because they are too high).  
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competitive effects of such behaviour needs revisiting. However, before doing this, it 
must be stressed that, although it changes our analysis to an extent, the fact that 
Domco practices differential pricing should not be sufficient in itself to constitute an 
abuse. Before differential pricing is considered as abusive there should be some 
element of competitive harm. This approach reflects that taken in the Treaty,
33 which 
only explicitly prohibits discriminatory pricing where this results in injury downstream 
(second line injury). Moreover, for discriminatory pricing to be condemned in the US, 
injury to competitors (first line injury) must be shown. We believe therefore that the 
Court and the Commission ought not to consider discrimination as abusive without 
due attention to the need to show the existence competitive harm.
34 We shall return 
to this question further on. 
Before looking at the potential issues of exclusion and exploitation created by 
selective price cutting to meet competition, we should first briefly consider what 
response antitrust law should give to this practice, if it is considered problematic. The 
three most obvious responses are (i) to impose a general price floor on Domco (ii) to 
insist that, if Domco wishes to make price cuts to meet competition from Newco, it 
makes these cuts across the board and (iii) a combination of the latter two i.e. 
allowing Domco to make across the board price cuts down to a certain level, for 
example down to the same level as Newco but not below. 
The appropriateness of each of these solutions will depend to a great extent on what 
the actual objection to selective price cutting is. Thus, if discrimination is the problem 
then some solution equalising prices must be envisaged. However, is the 
discrimination considered bad because it is exploitative? If this is the case, is the 
better remedy not to prohibit the excessive prices? But what is an excessive price 
and is discrimination per se an abuse? Alternatively, the discrimination might be 
considered problematic because it is exclusionary. But excluding whom? If the injury 
to competition is first line (exclusion of competitors) should one introduce a price floor 
or upward equalisation of prices? If the injury is second line (because the customer 
paying the higher price is disadvantaged vis-à-vis its competitors) then is it not only a 
                                                                                                                                                    
32  See supra footnote 1. 
33  Article 82(c) prohibits “applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage” (emphasis added). 
34  See, for example, Case C-18/93, Corsica Ferries, 1994, ECR p.I-1783.  
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question of equalising prices whether this be upward or downward equalisation? 
Thus, failure to identify correctly the type of abuse and resulting harm complained of 
can easily result in the imposition, not only of undertakings that will fail to solve the 
problem, but ones that might well exacerbate it. 
Having briefly highlighted these important background issues, we will now look at the 
potentially exclusionary and exploitative effects of selective price cutting. 
A.  Exclusion 
The arguments concerning exclusion laid out above with regard to across the board 
price cuts considered only exclusion of competitors (first line injury).
35 There seems to 
be no obvious reason why these arguments should not equally apply to selective 
price cuts. 
However, the selective price cutting scenario has the added element of differential 
pricing such that one could alternatively argue that customers paying the higher price 
are put at a disadvantage, with potentially exploitative effects in their regard (second 
line injury). 
B.  Exploitation 
As a preliminary point it should be noted that, according to the wording of Article 
82(c),  second line injury is arguably not an alternative argument but rather a 
prerequisite to the success of any claim that differential pricing is abusive (Article 
82(c) prohibits discrimination between trading partners “thereby placing them at a 
competitive disadvantage”). 
It is impossible to state in the abstract whether selective meeting competition causes 
second line injury as the answer to this question will depend entirely on the facts. 
Nevertheless, what can be emphasised here is that this condition cannot be ignored 
or read out of the Treaty. Other than relying on a simple textual argument, the 
principle reason for this is that discriminatory pricing has indeterminate effects.
36 If 
there is in fact no secondary line injury resulting from differential pricing then the 
danger of imposing equal pricing is that any positive effects that result from 
differential pricing will be lost and for no good reason. 
                                                 
35  It is worth pointing out here that discrimination can be considered illegal under US antitrust law only if it 
produces first line injury. However, even if first line injury has been shown to exist, the defendant may invoke a 
defence of meeting competition. 
36  SCHMALENSEE, R., “Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third-Degree Price Discrimination”, 
American Economic Review, 1981, Volume 71.  
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In fact, where discriminatory pricing has been alleged in meeting competition cases, 
the Court and Commission have usually made reference to second line injury.
37 This 
is to be cautiously welcomed but it should nevertheless be stressed that what should 
be required here is not a simple assertion that there is second line injury but rather 
concrete evidence that customers are put at a disadvantage e.g. because the input 
from the dominant firm constitutes an important cost element and they are in a 
competitive relationship with customers of the dominant undertaking paying lower 
rates. 
Exploitation can also take the form of excessive prices for those who do not benefit 
from the reduced tariffs. In the case of across the board price cuts, the alleged 
exploitation does not occur during Newco’s presence on the market but rather pre-
Newco entry and post-Newco exit. In the case of selective price cuts the alleged 
exploitation occurs, in addition, during the period of Newco’s presence on the market, 
in the form of higher prices being charged in those areas where Newco is not active 
(thus, although the added element of differential pricing highlights the allegedly 
excessive nature of Domco’s prices, the excessive pricing occurs throughout). 
This takes us back to the argument made above at point III that the competitive harm 
objected to must be clearly identified if we are not  to avoid counterproductive 
“remedies”. If exploitation truly is the problem then the difficulty does not reside in the 
relative level of the prices but the absolute level of the (higher) prices. Any remedy 
proposed here would therefore first and foremost involve imposing a price ceiling. 
The obvious difficulty with this is that this is diametrically opposed to the price floor 
remedy most often associated with the scenario of meeting competition. 
Even if the Court and Commission were to an extent concerned by exploitation,
38 it 
seems to us that exploitation cannot be alleged and proved on the sole basis of 
differences in price since there can clearly be factors explaining such differences 
other than a desire to exploit. Competitive pressure is the most obvious of these, 
which is of course the whole raison d’être of meeting competition. Thus, as the Court 
itself acknowledged in United Brands, price differences are caused by market forces 
                                                 
37  See e.g. CFI’s judgment in Irish Sugar, p.183; Commission Decision in Hilti, p.80. 
38  See e.g. Commission Decision in Hilti, p.81.  
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and are “due to fluctuating market factors such as […] the availability of […] 
competing [products]”.
39 
As stated above, price discrimination is a market reality and many efficiencies can be 
derived from it. 
 
Conclusions 
The central reason for writing this article was the perceived obscurity of this area of 
the law. While it is clear that the above contribution is not exhaustively reasoned, it 
does attempt to highlight the key problems with condemning meeting competition. 
Our key points in this regard can be briefly summarised as follows: 
-  across the board or selective price cuts  to meet competition should not be 
prohibited since the purpose of competition rules should not be to impose price floors 
so as to protect less efficient undertakings; 
-  selective price cuts to meet competition are as a general rule a reasonable 
reaction to competition and should not be prohibited by Article 82; 
-  the question of exploitation has not been sufficiently dealt with by the Court or 
Commission and its policy as regards this issue is unclear. This is highly regrettable 
as in cases where this is considered a problem, the most obvious solution (some form 
of price ceiling) will often be diametrically opposed to the solution that might be 
appropriate where the problem is exclusion (some form of price floor). 
The Court and Commission both accept that meeting competition is in certain 
circumstances legitimate and entirely compatible with Article 82.
40 However, in order 
to advise clients, lawyers must know when meeting competition is not acceptable and 
the only way this can be done is if the objections to the practice are clearly explained 
by the Court and Commission. 
 
 
 
                                                 
39  Case 27/76, United Brands, 1978, ECR p.207 at p.215. 
40  This has been reaffirmed either expressly or impliedly in every single decision listed supra footnote 1.  
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